November 24, 2009

GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS REJECTS DOT’S BID FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

Posted by Susan J. Levy

As an agency of the state, the Georgia Department of Transportation (“DOT”) is entitled to sovereign immunity except to the extent sovereign immunity has been waived by the provisions of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”). See Georgia Military College v. Santamorena, 237 Ga. App. 58, 61; O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21. Under the GTCA, the State has agreed to waive sovereign immunity for the torts of state officials and employees subject to certain exceptions and limitations. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-23 and 50-21-24. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24 enumerates 13 exceptions to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity. In DOT v. Miller, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1293 (November 10, 2009), DOT argued that the “discretionary function” exception to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff’s recovery. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument.

The “discretionary function” exception provides that "[t]he state shall have no liability for losses resulting from: . . . (2) The exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24 (2).

The GTCA then defines “discretionary function or duty” to mean “a function or duty requiring a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22 (2). “This definition of discretionary function is almost identical to the definition of discretionary function that has been developed by the federal courts in construing the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Brantley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Ga. 679, 682 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the discretionary function exception “is to prevent judicial ‘second guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,” and that, for that reason, “when properly construed, the exception ‘protects only government actions and decisions based on consideration of public policy.’” Id. citing U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), quoting Berkowitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988). “Under federal law, the discretionary function exception may apply not only to policy and planning level employees, but also to employees who make day-to-day operational and management decisions.” Id. at 683 citing U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991). “It is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies to a given case.” Id.

In Miller, Plaintiff’s decedent was killed after the vehicle he was driving hydroplaned, left the roadway, and landed submerged in a roadside pond. Plaintiff argued that DOT negligently failed to keep a culvert clear of debris which caused accumulated rainwater from the pond to cover the travel way of the road.

In support of its Motion for Directed Verdict, DOT argued it was entitled to sovereign immunity based on the Discretionary Function Exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity because DOT personnel could make a “judgment call” as to which culverts to inspect after each major storm. Id. At *3 and *4.

The Court disagreed, finding that the “judgment call” relied upon by DOT in Miller was not the type of discretionary function contemplated by the GTCA. Relying on DOT v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1996), (Georgia Supreme Court found that DOT's initial decision to extend a highway was a policy decision within the meaning of the discretionary function exception but the decision to open the road prior to completion with an alternative traffic control system was not.) the Court held that “the day-to-day decision of whether and where to send out DOT personnel to inspect for road hazards on the day in question was not a basic governmental policy decision for purposes of the GTCA.” Id. at *5.

November 16, 2009

TWO GEORGIA TRIAL COURTS LIMIT THE SCOPE OF O.C.G.A § 51-12-33, THE STATUTE PERMITTING APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT AMONG PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES

Posted by H. Lee Pruett

Since our January 26, 2009 post discussing a case this firm is defending in the State Court of DeKalb County and Judge Janis Gordon’s Order which denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Notice of Fault of Non-Party pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, at least two other Georgia trial courts have issued rulings somewhat at odds with Judge Gordon’s Order. To date, no appellate court has rendered a decision on any of the numerous issues being raised concerning the meaning and scope of this statute. The two trial court orders discussed below only emphasize the confusion litigants face in attempting to apply the statute to any given case.

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November 10, 2009

RECORD LOW TRAFFIC FATALITIES REPORTED FOR FIRST HALF OF 2009

Posted by Jonathan A. Barash

Traffic fatalities reached a record low in the first half of 2009, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration announced last month. An estimated 16,626 people died in motor vehicle accidents on U.S. roads between January - June of 2009 compared with 17,871 during the first half of 2008. This represents a 7% decline. According to the NHTSA report, traffic fatalities have been declining steadily since reaching their peak in 2005.

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November 2, 2009

A SHORT PRIMER ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

Posted by Susan J. Levy

“Electronic Discovery,” two words that strike fear into the hearts of many lawyers. Ask most seasoned litigators to define “metadata,” “native format,” or “clawback agreements” and you will see the eyes of the proverbial deer in the headlights. Unfortunately, however, the time has come to hold our collective noses and jump in or we risk disaster for our clients.

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October 26, 2009

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT RULES THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR AN AUTO PERSONAL INJURY CASE IS TOLLED UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S TRAFFIC OFFENSE

Posted by H. Lee Pruett

In Beneke v. Parker, Case No. S08G2078 (Ga. Sup. Ct., Sept. 28, 2009), the plaintiff’s Complaint was deemed timely even though it was filed two years and two weeks after the date of accident giving rise to the lawsuit. On April 27, 2005, the plaintiff was a passenger in a car which was rear-ended by the defendant. The defendant was cited for following too closely. The plaintiff filed her complaint for personal injuries on May 11, 2007. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations had run, but the trial court denied the motion. The trial court held that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitations until the defendant paid the fine in connection with his traffic citation. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 provides that the limitation period is “tolled from the date of commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated.”

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October 20, 2009

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT SENDS MESSAGE TO INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR BAD FAITH CLAIMS

Posted by Jonathan A. Barash

In a unanimous decision written by new Georgia Supreme Court Justice David E. Nahmias, the Court sent a message to liability insurers this week that even an offer to pay policy limits may not necessarily shield the company from a bad faith claim. In Fortner v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., the Court reiterated that the true question is still whether the insurance company acted reasonably in its response to the settlement offer.

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October 12, 2009

GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS FINDS NO VICARIOUS LIABILITY WHERE PLAINTIFF INJURED BY COUNTY EMPLOYEE

Posted by Susan J. Levy

In Williams v. Baker County, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1110 (September 22, 2009), Defendant William Land admitted causing an accident that injured Plaintiff when his vehicle struck her vehicle.

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September 4, 2009

GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS CLARIFIES STANDARD OF CARE FOR COMMON CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS

Posted by H. Lee Pruett

When a transit company’s employee assaults a passenger, can the company be held strictly liable? In Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc. v. Young, Case No. A09A1525 (Ga. Ct. App., Aug. 20, 2009), the Georgia Court of Appeals said no, strict liability did not apply.

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August 26, 2009

GEORGIA JOINS GROWING “TREND” OF JURISDICTIONS ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF EXPERT'S PERSONAL PRACTICE

Posted by Jonathan A. Barash

You are defending a medical malpractice lawsuit. At trial, plaintiff’s expert testifies that treatment your doctor-client failed to do was required by the applicable standard of care. From pre-trial discovery you know, despite her trial testimony, that plaintiff’s expert did not always employ that particular treatment in her own practice. Until two months ago, you would not be able to offer this evidence to impeach plaintiff’s expert. Evidence of an expert’s own practice was deemed irrelevant on the grounds that the standard of care is that which is employed by the medical profession generally, not what one individual doctor thought was advisable and would have done under the circumstance.

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August 5, 2009

JURORS USE OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTS ORDER IN THE COURT Part 2 of a 2-part Series

Posted by Susan J. Levy

In June, the Indiana Supreme Court decided a civil rape case where a juror received a cell phone call during deliberations. In Henri v. Curto, No. 49S02-0812-CV-641, (Ind. S. Ct., Jun. 17, 2009), the appellant challenged the verdict on the grounds that the juror’s receipt of an incoming cell phone call during jury deliberations pressured the panel to reach a hasty verdict. The Court upheld the verdict, but the Judge wrote:

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July 31, 2009

JURORS USE OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTS ORDER IN THE COURT Part 1 of a 2-part Series

Posted by Susan J. Levy

As a lawyer in 2009, there are certain things I am required to own: a suit, a briefcase, a laptop, and a Blackberry (mostly because I am not cool enough for an iPhone). Also, my chosen profession mandates that I take my cell phone everywhere, check my email constantly, and now, that I have the ability to text both my office and my clients.

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July 23, 2009

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT RULES THAT A “WET FLOOR” SIGN CAN ITSELF BE A HAZARD AND EXPOSE A PROPERTY OWNER TO LIABILITY

Posted by H. Lee Pruett

In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (2009), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a sign warning of a hazard can constitute a hazard itself. In this case, the plaintiff was a customer in the defendant’s movie theater. On the day of the accident, the theater was crowded and moments before the movie was over, the defendant’s employees placed a “wet floor” sign over a spill just outside the theater’s exit door. As the crowd left the theater, the sign collapsed. Because of the press of people, the plaintiff did not see the sign lying flat on the floor. She tripped on the sign, fell to the floor, and sustained serious injuries. She filed suit against the theater, alleging negligence.

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